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The Principle of Equal Protection
By MICHAEL J. PERRY*

In this Article, I set forth a particular conception of the constitutional principle of equal protection.' Then, in part to illustrate
my analysis, I apply my conception of equal protection to the
problem of age discrimination, which is the subject of this
Symposium.2

The Principle
What normative content ought the courts, in particular the
Supreme Court, to give the principle of equal protection, beyond
the normative content the framers of the fourteenth amendment
intended it to have? One possible answer, of course, is: "None.
The Court ought to give the principle only the content the framers
meant it to have."3 But on the assumption, not defended here, that
the Court can legitimately give the principle a normative content
beyond that intended by the framers,4 what content ought the
* Professor of Law, The Ohio State University. A.B., 1968, Georgetown University;
J.D., 1973, Columbia University.
1. By its terms, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment constrains
only state action: "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. But the Supreme Court has decided
that the fifth amendment due process clause shall be understood to constrain federal action
in the same way the equal protection clause constrains state action. See, e.g., Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). See also Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of
Equal Protection,55 N.C.L. REv. 541 (1977).
2. I have written this Article as a complement to an earlier essay in which I discussed
a number of matters not addressed here, in particular the original understanding of equal
protection (which was quite narrow) and the principal features of contemporary equal protection doctrine (some of which are flawed, in my view). See Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualizationand Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REv.1023 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Perry].
3. See, e.g., R. BEaGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICLARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
4. In defense of my claim that the Court can legitimately give constitutional principles
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Court to give it? Indeed, even if one insists that the Court cannot
legitimately give the principle any content beyond that disclosed
by the original understanding, the question still arises, what normative content ought electorally accountable policymakers, especially legislators, to give the principle of equal protection, when
the
5
principle is understood as a constituent of public morality?
The principle of equal protection is proscriptive, of course.
Understood as constitutional in character, the principle forbids
government to do something to persons. What, precisely, ought the
principle be deemed to forbid government to do? Should government be forbidden to treat any person differently from any other
person? Obviously not. Persons differ from one another in a variety-a seemingly infinite variety-of ways, and there is no merit in
a principle that forbids legal recognition of every such difference.
Such a principle would condemn, for example, laws providing aid
to poor persons.
Should government be forbidden to treat any person differently from any other person who is similarly situated?6 Such a conception of equal protection-a variation on the "treat like cases
alike" theme-is normatively empty, as commentators are fond of
pointing out.7 Equal protection, thus conceived, forbids nothing.

Or perhaps I should say that equal protection, thus conceived, permits every sort of hostile discrimination against one person, A, relative to another, B, because A and B are always dissimilarly situated (in a respect relevant to the aim of the differential treatment)
if A, but not B, is the object of antipathy, and the differential
treatment at issue is intended, in whole or in part, as an official
(governmental) expression of that antipathy.
Should the principle of equal protection be deemed to forbid
government to treat any person differently from any other person
on the basis of any factor that it is unconstitutional (or, if you prefer, unjust) for government to take into account? Such a concepcontent beyond anything imagined by the framers, see M.
COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS:

PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION,

THE

AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLI-

CYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY (Yale University Press forthcoming 1982).

5.

See Brest, The Conscientious Legislator'sGuide to ConstitutionalInterpretation,

27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975).

6. No two persons are ever similarly situated in all respects. The reference is to persons who are similarly situated in whatever respect is relevant to the aim of the differential
treatment.
7. See, e.g., P. POLyviOU, THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 7-8 (1980).
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tion of equal protection collapses any distinction between the principle of equal protection, which is a source of governmental duty
(and therefore of individual right), and any other constitutional
principles that are also sources of various governmental duties (individual rights)." For example, imagine a law that provides that no
Buddhist may hold political office. That law offends the principle-or at least a principle-of religious freedom. To be sure, one
can define equal protection so that the law offends the principle
of equal protection as well: Because the law treats one person-actually, one group of persons-differently from other persons on the basis of a factor (religious affiliation) that it is unconstitutional for government to take into account, it offends equal
protection. But note that the law offends equal protection, so defined, only because it offends a distinct principle, in this case, a
principle of religious freedom. To define equal protection to forbid
differential treatment of persons by government on the basis of
any factor that it is unconstitutional for government to take into
account is to render the principle superfluous or vacuous, for the
principles that will then do the real service in condemning certain
instances of differential treatment will be those that indicate which
factors it is unconstitutional for government to take into account.
The challenge is to define equal protection without collapsing the
distinction between that principle and any other constitutional
principles that are also sources of governmental duties-duties
that are as distinct from and independent of the duty to provide
equal protection as they are distinct from and independent of one
another. That is, the challenge is to give equal protection a normative content distinct from the normative content of other, discrete
principles, such as the principle of religious freedom. The principle
of equal protection would otherwise be superfluous.
I do not deny that "equality" is in some sense implicated
whenever any group is discriminated against in favor of any other
group, for in that case the former group, relative to the latter
group, is not treated "equally." But the "equality" that is inplicated whenever any group is discriminated against in favor of another group is a vacuous notion, just as the "liberty" that is implicated whenever anyone is prevented from doing what he or she
wants to do is a vacuous notion. Just as we must specify particular
8. The duties in question are duties to refrain from taking certain factors into account-religious affiliation, for example.
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principles defining particular legally protected liberties, so too
must we define particular principles defining particular legally protected equalities. "We must now cease to speak of equality in the
singular and proceed to deal with equalities in the plural ... .Just
as liberty actually comes down to the struggle to achieve particular
liberties, so equality is defined, historically speaking, as the repudiation of certain differences instead of others.", My effort here is to
indicate the particular equality defined by the principle of equal
protection. 1°
9.

G. SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 334 (1967), quoted in J. POLE, THE PURSUIT oF
356 (1978).
10. Professor Alexander has criticized my effort to "disentangle" equal protection
from due process and other constitutional principles. Compare Alexander, Modern Equal
Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique,42 Omo ST. L.J. 3, 51-57
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Alexander] with Perry, supranote 2, at 1074-83. For example, in
discussing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), Professor Alexander writes that "[t]he
true defect [of the durational residency requirement] was not a due process one stemming
from the effect on interstate travel, but rather an equal protection one stemming from the
new resident/old resident distinction in the award of welfare benefits." Alexander, supra, at
54. But I never suggested that the defect stemmed from the effect on interstate travel. I
agree that the defect stemmed from the distinction between new residents and old residents.
My point is that what makes that distinction problematic is not the principle of equal protection, but a distinct constitutional principle concerning the fundamental interest in interstate migration. Discussing Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), Professor
Alexander writes that "the defect in the law was the unjustified discrimination between
classes of demonstrators, an equal protection defect." Alexander, supra, at 55. I agree that
the defect was the discrimination between those who were permitted to picket and those
who were not. But I disagree with the view that this is 'an equal protection defect. It is a
defect, rather, under the first amendment, just as a discrimination against Buddhists in
favor of Christians would be a defect under the first amendment. Discussing Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464 (1977), Professor Alexander writes that the crucial question was "whether the
governmental distinction between those seeking abortions and those choosing childbirth, apparently to encourage the latter choice and discourage the former, was a valid discrimination ... an equal protection question. . . ." Alexander, supra, at 55. I agree with Professor
Alexander as to what was the crucial question, but I disagree that it is an equal protection
question. What renders the distinction at issue in Maher problematic is not the principle of
equal protection, but a distinct principle, if indeed it can be called a principle, or a distinct
one-the "right of privacy."
Professor Alexander argues that "if the Consiitution embodies one moral theory, then
unless that theory has as many ultimate principles as there are constitutional provisions
that reflect the theory, some of those provisions will merge with others at the most abstract
level." Id. at 51. I am not sure what Professor Alexander means by "the Constitution." If he
means the "written" Constitution (the Constitution as written and understood by the framers), why suppose that the framers all subscribed to the same moral theory? That supposition is implausible. If he means the "unwritten" Constitution (the Constitution as it has
been elaborated over time by successive Courts), why suppose that the Court, which is to
say the majorities of Justices who have comprised the Court, has subscribed to the same
moral theory? That, too, is an implausible supposition.
It is not clear whether Professor Alexander means to claim that in fact the Constitution
EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY
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I shall now indicate what normative content--distinctive normative content-I think the principle of equal protection ought to
be given. Let me begin with this statement of the principle: Government may not treat any person differently from any other person-in particular it may not disadvantage any person relative to
any other-on the basis of any factor that is not a determinant of a
person's moral status. I want to emphasize that this is only an incomplete or provisional statement of the principle. I shall indicate
embodies one moral theory. But at least he comes close to claiming just that. For example,
he claims to have dispelled the "myth . . . that the substantive values behind equal protection are independent of the substantive values behind other constitutional provisions....
[A]ithough equal protection theories can be constructed around values that are unrelated to
other constitutional values because they are not related to a set of ultimate values from
which all constitutional values flow, such theories are normatively unsatisfactory. For that
reason, they are less plausible in terms of proper standards of interpretation and judicial
review." Id. at 67. See also id. at 51 n.148. I do not dispute what I take to be his underlying
premise, which is that systems of political morality, like other systems, should aspire to
coherence and fundamental simplicity. But constitutional doctrine, like the (written) Constitution itself, is not and does not purport to be a system of political morality. Constitutional doctrine, like the Constitution, is a potpourri of political morality, precisely because it
reflects the fragmented character of the background culture (the culture of the Justices and
of the polity from whose ranks the Justices come). I might be willing to agree that constitutional doctrine ought to be transformed into a system of political morality. But first I would
like to hear, in convincing detail, about the particular system that Professor Alexander, or
anyone else, means to nominate. In that regard, see ,B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE I THE
LIERAL STATE (1980).
Professor Alexander also argues that "disentangling equal protection from due process
will often be quite difficult" even if the Constitution does not embody one moral theory.
"Disentangling will focus upon whether the defect in the rule is that the rule makes someone worse off than he would be under [any constitutionally permissible moral theory],"
which Professor Alexander takes to be a due process defect, or whether the defect is that
the rule is predicated, at least to some extent, on a constitutionally impermissible moral
theory, which he takes to be an equal protection defect. Alexander, supra, at 54. I do not
understand why substantive due process must be understood as concerned solely with defects in the form of impermissible effects, that is, effects making someone worse off than he
or she would be under any constitutionally permissible moral theory. Due process is conventionally understood as concerned, in part, with defects in the form of impermissible predicates-predicates involving a constitutionally impermissible moral theory. For example,
under the narrowest possible coherent reading of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the
substantive due process "right of privacy" forbids government to take any action predicated
on the view that abortion (before the stage at which a fetus is viable) is per se morally
objectionable. See Perry, Why the Supreme Court was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harrisv. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1113, 1115-21 (1980).
In any event, disentangling equal protection from due process, contrary to what Professor
Alexander argues, is not all that difficult. It is simply a matter of specifying the predicate or
predicates the principle of equal protection renders impermissible, as opposed to those different predicates that other, discrete constitutional principles-such as those subsumed by
due process, the right of interstate migration, freedom of expression, or the right of privacy-render impermissible.
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several refinements in due course. For now, let me clarify the notion of a person's "moral status." Moral status, like other kinds of
status (economic status, for example), is relative. The status of X
cannot be measured except in relation to the status of non-X.
From the point of view of the vast, impersonal cosmos, the status,
or worth, of no person is greater or lesser than the worth of anything else, and because nothing has any worth, no person has any
worth. As Art Leff would say, Mankind is no better-but no worse
either-than a flatworm. 11 By contrast, from the point of view of a
God who regards all persons as ends in themselves, the worth of no
person is greater or lesser than the worth of any other person, and
because every person has "infinite" worth, each person has infinite
worth.
From the point of view of a particular society of persons,
struggling to improve its material and spiritual condition, the
moral worth or status of a person is determined by the nature and
extent of the person's activities, native talents, acquired skills, and
needs. Activities, talents, and skills are the resources upon which
any society must principally rely in its effort to improve its condition. Needs-whether of an individual, a group, or of a whole society-constitute that which a society must identify, rank, and make
some progress towards satisfying if the society is to improve its
condition. Indeed, the state of a society's present material and
spiritual condition is in large part determined by the state of the
12
needs of the members of the society.

The function of extending or withholding praise or blame, approval or disapproval, is to encourage or discourage activities
deemed beneficial (or "right" or "good") or harmful (or "wrong" or
"evil") in the effort to satisfy needs. However, if a factor is not a
11. See Leff, Book Review, 29 STAN. L. Rav. 879, 888 (1977) reviewing R. UNGMR,
KNOWLEDGE AND POLTICS (1975). "[Mlankind is a species that doesn't mean anything at all,

except to itself ... If the species is or becomes one thing or another, or ceases to exist
altogether, nothing else cares-except perhaps some other sijecies which, mostly with joy,
might register the ecological impact of man's extinction. You are what you are, and will
become what you will become, and the goodness or badness of that being and becoming is
good for you, and you alone, to define and declare. No state of being is more authentic than
any other or, just because it exists, any better." See also Leff, Unspeakable Acts, Unnatural
Law, 1979 DuKE L.J. 1229.
12. One might almost say that needs are primary here. Activities, talents, and skills
are valuable mainly as resources on which society relies in its effort to meet the needs of
individuals and of the community. I am grateful to Dory Rand for clarifying the relationship
between activities, talents, and skills on the one hand, and needs on the other.
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determinant of a person's moral status-if the factor does not itself refer to or indicate anything about a person's activities, talents, skills, or needs-then that factor is morally irrelevant, that is,
irrelevant to any sensible evaluation of that person's moral status.
No person ought to be deemed, by virtue of a morally irrelevant
factor, less deserving of respect, concern, and opportunity for selffulfillment, or more deserving of subordination to or domination
by others."3 Extending or withholding respect or concern on the
basis of-adopting an attitude of approval or disapproval towards-a morally irrelevant factor makes no sense, because the
factor neither refers to nor indicates anything about any particular
activity, talent, skill, or need.
To elaborate and clarify my conception of equal protection, I
want to respond to some problems this conception might be
thought to raise. First, my conception of the principle of equal protection forbids government to treat any person differently from
any other person on the basis of any factor that is not a determinant of a person's moral status. But is there any factor that is
never a determinant of a person's moral status-a factor that is
always morally irrelevant? Assuming, for the sake of argument,
that there is no such factor, my conception of equal protection
nonetheless is consequential, because if government may not treat
any person differently from any other on the basis of any factor
that is not a determinant of a person's moral status, neither may it
treat any person differently on the basis of any factor that is not a
determinant of any relevant aspect of a person's moral status. Relevancy is measured by reference to the particular governmental
policy in question, of course.1 4 The fact that a woman can bear
children indicates something about her moral status, in the sense
in which I am using that term, but what it indicates, while relevant
13. This is not necessarily to say that no person ought to be deemed, by virtue of a
morally irrelevant factor understood as a proxy for another, morally relevant factor, less
deserving of respect. I shall address below the problem of governmental reliance on factors
that, while not themselves determinants of a person's moral status, are nonetheless proxies
for factors that are determinants. See text accompanying notes 53-55 infra.
14. See Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 115 (Jackson, J., concurring): "As
a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do not
think differences in treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to legislative purposes. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it can be pointed out between those bound and those left
free. This Court has often announced the principle that the differentiation must have an
appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or ordinance."
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to some governmental policies (at least, to some imaginable government policies), is irrelevant to others.
What if the particular governmental policy in question is simply to express dislike for the group disadvantaged by the differential treatment? That is, what if the policy is predicated on the view
that members of the disadvantaged class are intrinsically inferior-inferior without regard to their activities, talents, skills, or
needs-to persons who are not members of the class? That predicate offends the principle of equal protection, because it presupposes that to some extent a person's moral status is determined by
something other than the person's activities, talents, skills, or
needs. The principle of equal protection, however, presupposes
that no person is intrinsically inferior to any other person; it presupposes that all persons, considered without regard to their activities, talents, skills, or needs, have equal moral status or worth,
whether that worth be zero or infinite.1 5 The principle also presupposes that while there are, from the point of view of society, deviations in moral status among persons, these are wholly a function of
their activities, talents, skills, and needs.1 6
Why suppose that no person is intrinsically inferior to any
other person and that deviations in moral status are wholly a function of persons' activities, talents, skills, and needs? Why not suppose instead that deviations in moral status are due also to factors-skin complexion, for example, or eye color-that have
nothing to do (or so I will assume) with a person's activities, talents, skills, or needs? At least, why not suppose that it is morally
permissible-which is not to say that it is morally obligatory-to
deem moral status to be a function of such factors? I do not know
whether it is ethically permissible for an individual, acting in a
personal (nongovernmental) capacity, to attach significance to otherwise morally irrelevant factors, for example, to choose a spouse
in part on the basis of eye color. Perhaps individuals-who are
15. Cf. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91
HARv. L. REv. 1, 6 (1977) ("A society devoted to the idea of equal citizenship ... will
repudiate those inequalities that impose the stigma of caste and thus 'belie the principle
that people are of equal ultimate worth'. ") (quoting R. RoDE s, Tim LEGAL ENTERPRISE 163
(1976)) (emphasis added).
16. For a discussion of the notion of "intrinsic" worth and of the notion's place in
equal protection theory, see Baker, Three Models of Equal Protection (unpublished manuscript, a revised portion of which has been published under the title Neutrality, Process,
and Rationality: Flawed Interpretationsof Equal Protection,58 Tax. L. REv. 1029 (1980)).
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nonrational creatures in so many respects-are fated to do so. But
if a society of individuals qua government may attach significance
to otherwise morally irrelevant factors, then government may discriminate against black persons, for example, or blue-eyed persons,
simply because they are black or blue-eyed. A conception of equal
protection that permits government to treat some persons as intrinsicallyinferior to other persons offers no meaningful protection
against governmental discrimination. If the principle of equal protection is to have any consequential normative content at all, it
cannot permit government to attach significance, in particular to
attach negative significance, to otherwise morally irrelevant
factors.
My principle of equal protection can now be restated: Government may not treat any person differently from any other person on the basis of any factor that is not a determinant of any
relevant aspect of a person's moral status, when moral status is
understood to be wholly a function of a person's activities, talents,
skills, and needs. This statement of the principle, like the previous
statement, is incomplete. I shall later indicate another important
refinement.
Contemporary constitutional literature discloses several other
conceptions of the principle of equal protection. I shall briefly
mention what are perhaps the three most prominent other concep17
tions. First, there is the conception suggested by Ronald Dworkin
and amplified by James O'Fallon, 18 according to which every person has a right, against government, to "equal concern and
respect."
Government must treat those whom it governs with concern, that
is, as human beings who are capable of suffering and frustration,
and with respect, that is, as human beings who are capable of
forming and acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives
should be lived. Government must not only treat people with concern and respect, but with equal concern and respect.19
Professors Dworkin and O'Fallon also claim that the right to equal
concern and respect entails a duty on the part of government to
refrain from counting "external," as opposed to "personal," preferences in allocating burdens and benefits; in their view, counting
17. See R. DwommIN, TAKING RIGHTS SHRIOUSLY 272-78 (1977).
18. See O'Fallon, Adjudication and Contested Concepts: The Case of Equal Protection, 54 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 19 (1979).
19. R. DWORKI, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-78 (1977).
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external preferences constitutes a denial of the right to equal concern and respect.2 0 H.L.A. Hart has convincingly demonstrated
that Professor Dworkin's conception of the principle of equal protection is fundamentally defective."1 In particular, he has demonstrated that counting external preferences, contrary to what Professor Dworkin has said, is not a "form of double counting,""2 and
that counting external preferences is not otherwise a denial of the
right to equal concern and respect (on any plausible understanding
of that right).23 But perhaps Professor Hart's most fundamental
criticism is that "the ideas of 'equal concern and respect' and
treatment 'as equals' are either too indeterminate to play the fundamental role which they do in Professor Dworkin's theory or...
a vacuous use is being made of the notion of equality. 24 The interested reader should take time to read Professor Hart's compelling
critique.25
Next, there is the conception of equal protection-the "wethey" conception- developed by John Ely. 26 Because I think Professor Ely's conception is ambiguous, I should in fairness let him
speak for himself:
If the doctrine of suspect classifications is a roundabout way of
uncovering official attempts to inflict inequality for its own
sake-to treat a group worse not in the service of some overriding
social goal but largely for the sake of simply disadvantaging its
members-it would seem to follow that one set of classifications
we should treat as suspicious are those that disadvantage groups
we know to be the object of widespread vilification, groups we
know others (specifically those who control the legislative process) might wish to injure.
Note that the inquiry suggested is not whether there exists
20. The distinction between external and personal preferences, and the argument that
the right to equal concern and respect entails a governmental duty to refrain from counting
the former, are set forth in R. DWORKIN, TMONG RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 275-78 (1977) and
O'Fallon, Adjudication and Contested Concepts: The Case of Equal Protection,54 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 19, 38-43 (1979).
21. See Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 828, 836-46 (1979).
22. Id. at 841-42.
23. See id. at 842-44.
24. Id. at 844 & n.42.
25. See also Regan, Glosses on Dworkin: Rights, Principles,and Policies,76 MhCH. L.
REv. 1213, 1221 n.18 (1978); Baker, Neutrality,Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal Protection,58 Tax. L. Rav. 1029, 1057-58 (1980).

26. See J.

(1980).

ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT:

A

THEORY OF JuDiciALRaviaw

145-70
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unjustified widespread hostility toward the group disadvantaged
by the official act in issue-that would constitute a straightforward invitation to second-guess the legislative judgment-but
simply whether there exists widespread hostility. ....
The cases where we ought to be suspicious are not those involving
a generalization whose incidence of counterexample is "too high,"
but rather those involving a generalization whose incidence of
counterexample is significantly higher than the legislative authority appears to have thought it was....
By seizing upon the positive myths about the groups to which
they belong and the negative myths about those to which they
don't, or for that matter the realities respecting some or most
members of the two classes, legislators, like the rest of us, are
likely to assume too readily [not that there are not counterexamples, but that the incidence of counterexample is significantly
27
lower than it really is].
Why is Professor Ely's conception ambiguous? On the one
hand, he seems to acknowledge that equal protection forbids "official attempts to inflict inequality for its own sake-to treat a group
worse not in the service of some overriding social goal but largely
for the sake of simply disadvantaging its members." That is, he
seems to acknowledge that equal protection forbids government to
treat any person as intrinsicallyinferior to any other person. But,
on the other hand, Professor Ely insists that the question for a
court "is not whether there exists unjustified widespread hostility
toward the group disadvantaged by the official act in issue.., but
simply whether there exists widespread hostility." This suggests
that he means to say that equal protection forbids differential
treatment of persons by government only if that treatment is
based on "a generalization whose incidence of counterexample is
significantly higher than the legislative authority appears to have
thought it was." But if that is his conception of equal protection,
the conception is much too weak; it applies only to discriminatory
classifications predicated on problematic factual generalizations-non-normative generalizations-about the group in question. Equal protection thus conceived does not proscribe any discriminatory classification predicated on a normative vision of the
members of the group in question as intrinsicallyless worthy than
27. Id. at 153-54, 157, 159 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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other persons."' As I explained above, any conception of equal protection that permits that result offers no meaningful protection
against governmental discrimination. As Professor Alexander has
stated:
[I]f Ely wishes to treat mistakes as violations of equal protection
without regard to ultimate moral principles, then his position is
-subject to the reductio ad absurdum of all pure mistake theories:
so long as the government is pursuing evil ends through means
that are well-suited
to those ends, it does not violate equal
9
2

protection.

A conception of equal protection that forbids discrimination only
when it is based on "a generalization whose incidence of counterexample is significantly higher than the legislative authority appears
to have thought it was" is naive and largely worthless: "We can
easily reduce our detractors to absurdity and show them their hostility is groundless. But what does this prove? That their hatred is
real. When every slander has been rebutted, every misconception
cleared up, every false opinion about us overcome, intolerance it28. Cf. Benn, Equality, Moral and Social, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHLosoPHY 38, 40 (P.
Edwards ed. 1967): "[IThe principle of equal consideration does presuppose an initial commitment or decision, for it takes for granted whose interests are to count. No one claims
equal consideration for all mammals--human beings count, mice do not, though it would
not be easy to say why not. The Greeks made a similar distinction between themselves and
barbarians, Aristotle between natural slaves and naturally free men, the slaves counting only
as tools for the free men. It is not easy to see how anyone who seriously held that white men
mattered but black did not could be reasoned out of this position, any more than one could
argue for the equality of men and mice. Of course, many people who practice discrimination
profess to believe that black men are in some way inferior to white, in intelligence, sensibility, responsibility, or some such quality, and on this account ought to be treated differently.
But this is to admit the principle of equal consideration for all men, that all men count, and
that an argument has to be made to justify discriminating against some among them. The
man who denies that they count at all is not bound to show reasons, any more than we feel
the need to show reasons for treating inanimate objects, plants, or primitive organisms, such
as amoebae, according to our pleasure. Although we hesitate to inflict unnecessary pain on
sentient creatures, such as mice or dogs, we are quite sure that we do not need to show good
reasons for putting human interests before theirs. The boundaries of moral consideration
are enlarged in practice by awakening sympathy and imagination; moral reasons presuppose
an initial moral concern.
"The principle of equal consideration may be more, therefore, than what is necessarily
implied by the concept of rational action. The notion of acting with good reason does not in
itself rule out any inequality of treatment, for it may always be possible to argue that there
is some relevant difference between members of a given class. But the principle that all men
should be treated as members of the class whose equality is procedurally presupposed is not
necessarily implied by the notion of rational action."
29. Alexander, supra note 10, at 46.
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self will remain finally irrefutable."3 0
I doubt Professor Ely really means to say that equal protection forbids differential treatment of persons by government only
when it is based on a problematic factual generalization about the
group in question. I suspect he would agree that equal protection
forbids differential treatment of persons by government also, even
primarily, when that treatment presupposes that any person is intrinsically inferior to any other person. For example, Professor Ely
writes that "[t]o disadvantage a group essentially out of dislike is
surely to deny its members equal concern and respect, specifically
by valuing their welfare negatively."3 " If I am correct, then Professor Ely's point about generalizations whose incidence of counterexample is higher than the legislative authority likely thought is best
understood merely as a point about governmental reliance on
32
proxy factors, an issue I address later in this Article.
The final conception of equal protection I want to mention
here is that developed by Owen Fiss. 3 In Professor Fiss' view,
equal protection should be deemed to forbid any governmental action that "aggravates [perpetuates?] the subordinate position of a
specially disadvantaged group."'" What is a "specially disadvantaged group"? Professor Fiss answers by referring to the prototypical such group-black persons:
[B]lacks should be viewed as having three characteristics that are
relevant in the formulation of equal protection theory: (a) they
are a social group; (b) the group has been in a position of perpetual subordination; and (c) the political power of the group is severely circumscribed. Blacks are . . .a specially disadvantaged
group, and I would view the Equal Protection Clause as a protec30. Goldstein, Deutsch-JudischerParnass, quoted in J. BOSWELL, CHmsTIANIrY, SOciAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY vii (1980).

31. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRus. A THEORY OF JuDicIAL REvIEw 157 (1980).
32. For arguments, not relevant to the present discussion, that Professor Ely's concept
of equal protection is not, as he seems to think, simply process-oriented and otherwise
value-neutral, see Alexander, supra note 10, at 44-51; Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretationsof Equal Protection,58 TEx. L. REV. 1029 (1980); Brest,
The Substance of Process, 42 Owo ST. L. J. 131 (1981). Professor Alexander has argued,
with particular reference to Professor Ely's "we-they" conception, that "to the extent that
equal protection rules out or rules in any ultimate standard of moral worth, it is unquestionably substantive." Alexander, supra note 10, at 45. I agree.
33. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 J. PHILosopEy & PuB. AFT.
107 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Fiss].
34. Id. at 157.
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tion for such groups.3 5
Any specially disadvantaged group, as Professor Fiss elaborates the term, 6 exists because society has attached negative significance to a morally irrelevant factor-a factor that is not a determinant of any relevant aspect of a person's moral status.
Certainly the prototypical specially disadvantaged group exists for
just that reason. Indeed, one reason-a cardinal reason-why society ought not to attach negative significance to morally irrelevant
factors is precisely because doing so helps create specially disadvantaged groups. But of course this is not to say that it is wrong
for society to attach negative significance to a morally irrelevant
factor only when doing so eventuates in a specially disadvantaged
group. To the contrary, it is unjust for society to attach negative
significance to a morally irrelevant factor even when doing so does
not eventuate in a specially disadvantaged group, but only in harm
to, and suffering on the part of, the particular individuals affected.
At least, equal protection must be deemed to forbid society qua
government to attach negative significance to any morally irrelevant factor, because, as I have already explained, if equal protection were to permit government to do that, equal protection would
offer no meaningful protection against discriminatory governmental action.37 Thus, I cannot accept the claim, which Professor Fiss
is quite explicit in making, that equal protection should be viewed
only "as a prohibition against group-disadvantaging practices," not
as a prohibition against governmental action that attaches negative
significance to morally irrelevant factors. 8 Are "illegitimates" a
"specially disadvantaged group"? They are not if I understand
Professor Fiss' careful elaboration of the latter term.39 Does he
35. Id. at 154-55.
36. See id. at 148-49.
37. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
38. See Fiss, supra note 33, at 159-60.
39. For example, Professor Fiss seems to say that "the poor" are not a specially disadvantaged group: "[B]lacks have occupied the lowest socioeconomic rung in America for at
least two centuries and will continue to do so unless redistributive measures are instituted.
True, we may have always had and perhaps will always have people called 'the poor,' but
that is to confuse a stratum with the occupant of a stratum ....
[Bilacks face disabilities
not encountered by the poor (even conceived of as a group). These disabilities manifest
themselves in all spheres of life-economic, social, and political-and derive from the fact
that the individuals are members of the racial group. These are disabilities that do not
saddle persons who are poor. Indeed, in order to elevate themselves, the white poor have
incentives to disassociate themselves from the blacks and to accentuate the racial distinction. They have incentives to make blackness the lowest status, for of necessity it is a status
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then really mean to suggest that discrimination against illegitimates is not problematic under equal protection? If his conception
of equal protection entails such a claim, then it is a rather idiosyncratic conception and, in my view, an unacceptably narrow one.
Why not view equal protection as disfavoring Professor Fiss'
"group-disadvantaging practices," but also, and more fundamentally, as prohibiting governmental action.that attaches significance
to morally irrelevant factors? Anticipating some such question,
Professor Fiss has argued:
Admittedly, racially discriminatory conduct need not be
viewed... as a species of the genus of group-disadvantaging conduct. It could be viewed as the member of another genus, that of
unfair treatment: what is wrong, it may be argued, with using
race as the criterion for admission to a swimming pool or a public
housing project is that it is a form of unfair treatment-an individual is being judged (for the purpose of allocating the scarce
resource) on the basis of an irrelevant characteristic. The problem, however, is one of double membership: arbitrary discrimination is a member of the genus of unfair treatment as well as that
of group-disadvantaging conduct. Double membership is possible
because of an area of overlap of the two genuses (unfair treatment
and group-disadvantaging conduct), though to be sure, the
40
genuses are not coextensive, nor is one embraced by the other.
This argument ignores the fact that "group-disadvantaging conduct," as Professor Fiss elaborates the notion,"" is embraced by
"unfair treatment." For example, what he rightly regards as a principal group-disadvantaging practice-governmental action that has
a disproportionate racial impact-is disfavored by equal protection understood as a prohibition on governmental action that attaches negative significance to morally irrelevant factors. 3
Professor Fiss designed his conception of equal protection
mainly to validate the results he thinks courts should reach in
cases involving equal protection challenges to governmental action
into which they cannot fall." Id. at 162. If the poor are not a specially disadvantaged group,
it would seem to me that (perhaps a fortiori) illegitimates are not either. But then I do not
claim fully to comprehend Professor Fiss' criteria of a "specially disadvantaged group" or
even of a "social group." See notes 35-36 & accompanying text supra.
40. Fiss, supra note 33, at 159.
41. See id. at 157-64.
42. See id. at 157-60.
43. See Perry, supra note 2, at 1040-42. Under Professor Fiss' concept of equal protection, governmental action having a disproportionate racial impact is not forbidden, but is
merely disfavored. See Fiss, supra note 23, at 157.
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having a disproportionate racial impact and governmental programs of preferential treatment for blacks." Like Professor Fiss, I
think that the former ought to be disfavored45 and the latter generally sustained. 4 But to reach such results equal protection need
not be conceived in the way Professor Fiss recommends. My conception of equal protection, for reasons I have set forth in detail in
my earlier essay on equal protection, is adequate to the task.47 For
that reason, I do not see any advantage in Professor Fiss' conception. I do see significant disadvantage, however: first, the considerable difficulty of identifying "specially disadvantaged groups"
under Professor Fiss' conception; 48 and second, the tension 9 the
group-centered conception creates with our individual-centered
constitutional jurisprudence.50
The Principle Applied: Age Discrimination
My conception of the principle of equal protection forbids
government to treat any person differently from any other person
on the basis of any factor that is not a determinant of any relevant
aspect of a person's moral status. I must now introduce a final refinement into that statement of the principle. Although a particular factor might not itself be a determinant of any relevant aspect
of a person's moral status, it might nonetheless correlate with another factor that is a determinant. Government, for the sake of administrative convenience, might want to rely on the former factor
as a proxy for the latter factor. Equal protection has never been
thought to prohibit government from ever relying on a proxy factor. 51 Accordingly, I should say that the principle of equal protection forbids government to treat any person differently from any
other person on the basis of any factor that is neither a determinant of, nor a proxy for a factor that is a determinant of, any
relevant aspect of a person's moral status.
Of course, equal protection, thus conceived, does not authorize
44. See Fiss, supra note 33, at 170-77.
45. See note 43 supra.
46. Compare Fiss, supra note 33, at 147-64, with Perry, supra note 2, at 1040-50.
47. See Perry, supra note 2, at 1040-50.
48. See note 39 supra.
49. A tension more with respect to rhetoric, I think, than results.
50. See Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple,90 HIv. L.
REv. 1, 48-52 (1976).
51. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).

May 1981]

EQUAL PROTECTION

government to rely on a proxy factor anytime it so chooses. Sometimes there is reason to suspect that governmental reliance on a
particular proxy factor conceals the view that members of the
group defined in terms of the proxy factor have an intrinsically
inferior moral status; at least, sometimes there is reason to suspect
that government would not have relied on the proxy factor but for
a (perhaps latent) cultural understanding to that effect. 5 When
there is good reason for such suspicion, it makes sense for the judiciary to disfavor governmental reliance on the proxy factor by subjecting that reliance to a standard of review stricter than the "rational basis" standard. 5 The matter of classification-by-proxy,
which I have addressed elsewhere, 5" is relevant to the problem of
age discrimination.
The problem of age discrimination-as indeed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 55 would suggest-is really the
problem of discrimination against older persons, in particular persons beyond middle age. No one seriously claims that it is constitutionally problematic for government to treat fifteen-year olds, for
example, differently from twenty-one-year olds with respect to a
wide variety of matters. "Youth" is a proxy for "immaturity,"
whether physical, intellectual, or emotional, and unlike, for example, gender, it is not a proxy about which we need be suspicious.
So, in discussing the problem of age discrimination, I shall confine
myself to the problem of discrimination against older persons.
The particular age discrimination issue that arises in the constitutional context is almost invariably compulsory retirement."
52. For example, the fact that a particular person is a woman does not necessarily
mean that she is physicially weaker than the "average" man. Nonetheless, few would deny
that feminine gender is a proxy for physical capacity. Yet, there is excellent reason to suspect that a policy providing that no woman may assume a particular, physically demanding
job-as opposed to a policy requiring every applicant for the job to meet a test of physical
strength-would not exist but for the view that physically demanding jobs are "man's
work."
53. On the rational basis standard, see Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979). See
also Perry, supra note 2, at 1067-74. See note 80 infra.

54. See Perry, supra note 2, at 1052-53.
55.

29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. I 1979).

56. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Massachusetts Ed. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); Malmed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565 (3d Cir. 1980); Lamb v.
Scripps College, 627 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1980); Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623 (7th
Cir.) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906 (1979); Palmer v. Ticcione, 576 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1978) cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979); Gault v. Garrison, 569 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 440
U.S. 945 (1979); O'Neil v. Baine, 568 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1978).
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Laws authorizing compulsory retirement 57 are perhaps the paradigmatic example of age discrimination." How should such laws fare
under the principle of equal protection? In the courts, compulsory
retirement laws have fared very well, 59 but that is not to say that
they should fare well. Recall what sort of factor equal protection
(as I conceive it) forbids government to rely on in treating some
persons differently from other persons, in particular in disadvantaging some persons relative to others: any factor that is
neither (1) a determinant of any relevant aspect of a person's
moral status nor (2) a proxy for a factor that is a determinant of a
person's moral status.
Is the fact that a person is seventy years of age rather than
sixty-nine-or sixty rather than fifty-nine, or fifty rather than
forty-nine-a proxy for a factor that is a determinant of a person's
moral status? The answer must be yes, it seems to me. Age correlates with physical capacity,60 and so government might want to
rely on age as a proxy for physical capacity. In Massachusetts
Board of Retirement v. Murgia l and in Vance v. Bradley6 2 the
compulsory retirement provisions were sustained. In Murgia,
which involved a requirement that uniformed state police officers
retire at age fifty, the Supreme Court noted that "'even [the challenging party's] experts concede that there is a general relationship
between advancing age and decreasing physical ability to respond
to the demands of the job.' ,,63 In Vance, the Court accepted the
defending party's contention that the requirement that certain
Foreign Service employees retire at age sixty served government's
interest in removing "from the Service those who are sufficiently
57. For several examples of such laws, see the cases cited in note 56 supra.
58. A related problem is posed by age limits that restrict the availability of new jobs.
See Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 H.Av. L. REv. 380
(1976).
59. Gault v. Garrison, 569 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979),
is the only case in which a federal court of appeals has ruled against a compulsory retirement provision. The other circuits have declined to follow Gault. See, e.g., Lamb v. Scripps
College, 627 F.2d 1015, 1019-21 (9th Cir. 1980).
60. See Note, The Age Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967, 90 HRv. L. Rv.
380, 384 (1976): "[A]ge is at some point inherently related to ability, a fact which is implicitly recognized by both the legislative history and the provisions of the [Age Discrimination
in Employment Act]." (emphasis in original).
61. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
62. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
63. 427 U.S. at 310-11 (quoting the trial court opinion 376 F. Supp. 753, 755 (D. Mass.
1974)).
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old that they may be less equipped or less ready than younger persons to face the rigors of overseas duty in the Foreign Service.""
As I indicated before, however, equal protection does not
authorize government to rely on a proxy factor anytime it so
chooses. Is there good reason to suspect that government would
not rely on age as a proxy for physical capacity but for a cultural
understanding to the effect that older persons have an intrinsically
inferior moral status? 5 I do not know the answer, and I am reluctant to speculate. I am content, for the present, to identify it as a
crucial question in deciding whether compulsory retirement provisions should be subject to a stricter than rational basis standard of
review."6 The principal function of a stricter standard is to reveal
whatever illicit consideration is suspected to underlie classifications of the sort in question.6 7 The Supreme Court seems not to be
particularly suspicious about age-based classifications. In concluding that compulsory retirement provisions shall be subject merely
to the rational basis standard, the Court in Murgia reasoned:
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been
wholly free from discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those
who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a "history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the
basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their
abilities.68
Kenneth Karst, sounding a rather different note, has suggested that "[i]f any group in our society is systematically consigned to the status of 'nonpersons,' it is the aged."6 9 Let us assume, with Professor Karst's observation in mind, that there isa
64. 440 U.S. at 98.
65. I am assuming for the moment that government may not deem age to be a determinant of moral status. I shall abandon that assumption below and defend a contrary
position.
66. Another question in deciding whether to subject compulsory retirement provisions
to a stricter standard of review concerns the constitutional weight to be accorded an individual's interest, in particular an older person's interest, in keeping his or her job. See, e.g.,
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 322-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(1976). But that is not an equal protection question, in my view. See Perry, supranote 2, at
1074-83. See also note 10 & accompanying text supra.
67. See Perry, supra note 2, at 1033-36.
68. 427 U.S. at 313. See also Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 90 HARv. L. REV. 380, 383-88 (1976).
69. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under !the Fourteenth Amendment, 91
HAnv. L. REV. 1, 23 n.122 (1977).
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reason to be suspicious about governmental reliance on age as a
proxy factor. Ought we to conclude, on the basis of that assumption, that courts should disfavor governmental reliance on age as a
proxy factor by subjecting such reliance to a stricter standard of
review? The answer, I think, is probably no. To disfavor governmental reliance on 'age as a proxy factor is of course to favor reliance on individualized inquiry into the presence or absence of the
factor for which age would have been the proxy. Yet, there are
good reasons not to favor reliance on individualized determinations
in this context.
Substituting individualized determinations of physical fitness
for age-based classifications would pose two considerable problems.
First, it is difficult for medical science to predict when an older
person-one over sixty, say, or even one over fifty-will succumb
to the rigors of a physically demanding, stressful job, like the jobs
involved in Murgia and in Vance. Second, individualized determinations of a particular person's "absolute" fitness are in any event
somewhat beside the point, because what is typically at issue is
"relative" fitness. That is, what is at issue is less whether an older
person meets specified fitness requirements than whether younger
persons are generally more fit. If younger persons are generally
more fit, why should the Massachusetts Legislature not be permitted to decide that it is preferable, as a matter of public policy, to
have a larger proportion of younger persons in the uniformed state
police? I suppose one might suggest that if relative physical fitness
is the issue, or at least an important issue, individualized determinations can ascertain relative °fitness too. But how might the inquiry be framed? Would the question be whether a particular fiftyyear old is as physically fit as the considerably younger person who
would likely be hired to fill the position that would open up were
the fifty-year old to retire or be retired? It hardly seems necessary
to have individualized determinations to ascertain such a thing.
Of course, there are many compulsory retirement provisions
that do not rely on age as a proxy for physical fitness, or at least
that are much better understood in other terms. An example is the
provision sustained in Trafelet v. Thompson,70 under which state
judges, with certain exceptions, were required to retire after the
first general election following their seventieth birthday. It is not
70. 594 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1979). See also Maimed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565 (3d
Cir. 1980); O'Neil v. Baine, 568 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1978).
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implausible to understand such a provision as relying on age simply as a proxy for mental fitness, but I think that a provision like
that sustained in Trafelet is better understood in other terms, that
is, as relying on age, not simply as a proxy for a factor that is a
determinant of moral status, but as itself a determinant of moral
status. I shall have more to say about compulsory retirement, thus
understood, in a moment. But for now assume that a provision like
that sustained in Trafelet does in fact rely on age simply, or primarily, as a proxy for mental fitness. Age correlates with mental
fitness only to a limited degree. 71 Ought there then to be individualized determinations of mental fitness? What an unseemly mess
that would be. The court in Trafelet properly reasoned:
Fitness to be a policeman is more susceptible of objective evaluation than fitness to be a judge, because decline in the intellectual
ability and the personality factors essential for effective judicial
performance are more difficult to measure than decline in physical condition. The Illinois evaluation means to which plaintiffs refer [by way of contending that an apparatus for individualized
determinations of mental fitness already exists], involve an investigation, a complaint, and an adjudicative hearing. As a practical
matter, this cumbersome individualized removal procedure, attended as it is with stigma to the judge, is unlikely to be used
except in the most extreme cases ....

It was entirely rational for

the legislature to believe that the most satisfactory way to insure
a vigorous judiciary was to impose a maximum age limitation.72
In any event, there is a better way, as I said, to understand a provision like that sustained in Trafelet.
Compulsory retirement provisions do not always rely on age
simply as a proxy for fitness, whether physical or mental. Often,
perhaps invariably, compulsory retirement provisions, as I will explain, assume that (old) age is itself a determinant of a person's
moral status and not merely a proxy for some other factor that is a
determinant. If age is a determinant of a person's moral status-or
may legitimately be viewed as such-and if government is relying
on age not simply as a proxy but as itself a determinant of moral
status, then of course there are excellent reasons not to require
71. A greater proportion of older persons than younger persons suffer from senility, for
example, but that proportion is small.
72. 594 F.2d at 628-29 (footnote omitted). See also Mahned v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d
565, 572 (3d Cir. 1980). The same might be held true of fitness to be a teacher. See, e.g.,
Lamb v. Scripps College, 627 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1980); Palmer v. Ticcione, 576 F.2d 459 (2d
Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979).
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government to resort to individualized determinations. Requiring
individualized determinations makes sense only if government is
relying on age simply as a proxy for another factor and the court
concludes that government ought to bypass the proxy and concern
itself directly with that other factor. The crucial question, therefore, is whether age' is a determinant of moral status. I think it may
legitimately be viewed as such. Recall one of the principal objectives of the compulsory-retirement provision sustained in Vance.
The provision, the Court noted, was "an integral part of the personnel policies of the [Foreign] Service designed to create predictable promotion opportunities and thus spur morale and stimulate
superior performance in the ranks. . . ...
7 Certainly that is a legit-

imate objective. -Analogous objectives explain other familiar compulsory retirement provisions. Consider, for example, the court's
statement in Palmer v. Ticcione7 4 that "[u]nrelated to any notion
of physical or mental fitness, a state might prescribe mandatory
retirement for teachers in order to open up employment opportunities for young teachers-particularly in the last decade when
supply has outpaced demand, or to open up more places for minorities....
Another court used similar reasoning in Lamb v.
Scripps College,78 saying that "[t]he California Legislature could
have reasonably concluded that the challenged policy would...
stimulate performance among younger faculty members by assuring a predictable number of available positions .... 77 Consider,
finally, the Missouri Supreme Court's statement in O'Neil v.
Baine,7 1 in which it sustained a provision requiring certain state
judges to retire at age seventy:
[M]andatory retirement increases the opportunity for qualified
persons-men and women alike-to share in the judiciary and
permits an orderly attrition through retirement .... Such a pro-

vision not only achieves the maximum in qualified judicial personnel, but equally important widens the opportunities for qualified younger members of the Bar to seek a judicial post.
73. 440 U.S. at 98. See also id. at 101: "Congress was intent... on stimulating the
highest performance in the ranks of the Foreign Service by assuring that opportunities for
promotion would be available despite limits on the number of personnel classes and on the
number of positions in the Service."
74. 576 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979).
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 462.
627 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1021-22.
568 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1978).
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Rephrasing Palmer v. Ticcione, a state might prescribe a
mandatory retirement for judges in order to "open up" judicial
opportunities for younger lawyers .... 79
In what sense do compulsory retirement provisions, with the
goal of "opening up" positions and thereby stimulating morale and
performance and even career choice, assume that (old) age is itself
a determinant of moral status? Obviously if positions are to be
opened up, then, given the limited number of positions available,
some persons will have to retire or be retired. One possibility
(though certainly not a realistic one) is to retire persons by lottery.
Another possibility is to retire persons by years of service. Still another possibility is to retire persons by age. What does the choice
to retire persons by age imply? Most persons need to be engaged in
"work," in the sense of productive activity that contributes, in
some fashion, to the material or spiritual well-being of the community. Certainly this is a need older persons have as well as younger
persons. But older persons have had their chance-their turn-to
satisfy that need (which ought not to be confused with financial
need, which is a distinct matter). Surely it is not unreasonable, or
morally improper, to think that younger persons ought to be given
their chance, too.
The sense in which compulsory retirement provisions frequently, if implicitly, assume that age is itself a determinant of
moral status thus is that older persons, simply by virtue of being
older persons, have had a turn, and younger persons deserve a turn
too. They too need a turn. Thus, age can be said to determine
need. Consider this analogy: A Good Samaritan must decide
whether to rescue from a fire either a young child or an aged person-he or she does not have time to rescue both-and, knowing
nothing about either person, chooses to rescue the child. The issue
is not whether he or she was morally obligated to make that choice,
but whether the choice was a morally permissible one. Surely no
one will deny that it was permissible. Similarly, I doubt anyone
will insist that it is impermissible to suppose that age is a determinant of moral status in the way compulsory retirement provisions
assume. Note that here "age" is not doing service for some other
factor with which age is thought to correlate to some extent.
Rather, it is (old) age itself, in the sense of a life lived for a certain
period of time-a turn given-that is determinative. Or, put an79. Id. at 767.
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other way, it is (young) age that is determinative, in the sense of a
life not yet lived-a turn not yet given, and therefore still needed.

Conclusion
For the various reasons I have set forth, the principle of equal
protection, as I think it should be conceived, does not call for
courts to disfavor age discrimination, at least age discrimination in
its paradigmatic form-compulsory retirement laws. Such laws
should be, and are, subject to a rational basis standard of review80
so far as equal protection is concerned. This is not to deny that
there may be one or more constitutional principles other than
equal protection that call for courts to disfavor compulsory retirement laws.81 Nor is it to deny that Congress, or state legislatures,
ought to impose constraints on age discrimination more severe
than those the courts should enforce in the name of equal protection. After all, to say that a compulsory retirement provision comports with equal protection is not to say that it is morally desirable
or politically provident.

80. Of course, there may be disagreement as to how a rational basis standard of review
should operate. Compare United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 101 S.Ct. 453, 458-63
& n.10 (1980) (majority opinion), with id. at 463-71 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
81. See note 66 supra.

